Plea Bargaining – A Judicial Tool for Courts and Prisons Decongestion
Christine O. Ike*
Abstract
This paper aims to review plea bargaining and advocate the use of its merits as a way out of the notoriously lethargic Nigerian criminal justice system where protracted prosecution with its cost implication and low rate of success not to mention outright failures in some cases sometime due to loss of momentum and zeal of prosecuting officers, loss of exhibits and death of witnesses has nearly crippled the administraion of justice. A comparative review of this procedure as practised in United States of America shows that if the proper safeguards are put in place, it will go a long way to help decongest the courts and prisons. The article recommends its adoption as a useful tool in the Nigerian criminal justice system.
1. Introduction
Crime and criminality have been associated with man since his fall. Crime remains elusive and ever strives to hide itself in the most unlikely places. Different nations have adopted different strategies to contend crime depending on their nature and extent. One thing is certain. It is that a nation with high incidence of crime cannot grow or develop. That is so because crime is the antithesis of the former. It leaves in its trail negative social and economic consequences.[1]
President Olusegun Obasanjo had at the inception of his administration on May 29, 1999 made anti-corruption fight his signature issue. The awareness campaign of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission began in earnest during his tenure in office as the Nigerian Head of State.
That Nigeria has had a long running battle with corruption is now a cliché. Nigeria has been dubbed one of the most corrupt countries in the world. It was ranked the sixth most corrupt nation in the world in the year 2005.[2] The country has been tagged a “financial terrorist” nation on account of the sheer volume of financial crimes that occur in the country starting with improper foreign exchange dealings within and outside the banks, embezzlement, currency-counterfeiting, illegal capital transfers, banking and insurance fraud, bunkering, advanced fee fraud a.k.a. 419, over invoicing and money laundering.
Even though our statute books are littered with provisions regulating the conduct of public officers in both public and private sectors of the administration[3], Nigeria continues to witness an upsurge in financial crimes. Therefore, the solution to this scourge had more to do with enforcement of the provisions of the existing laws than anything else.
The alarming dimension both locally and internationally which those crimes have assumed led to the establishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in the year 2002. It was obvious from inception that the Commission had its work cut out for it because of the formidable opposition it got from its targeted economic criminals who armed with limitless arsenal of slush fund, were able to impede and frustrate the work of the Commission. The commision made little or no progress for years.
It may not be far from the truth to state that it was in sheer exasperation that the Commission resorted to employing plea bargaining as a way out. This bold and unprecedented move understandably generated a lot of furore from the public which felt duped and shortchanged by the fact that the people who ripped them off are getting away with “ murder “ so to speak and living to enjoy their loot with only a smack on their wrists which plea bargainng represents.
2. Meaning of Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is defined as a negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offence or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other charges. It is also termed plea agreement; negotiated plea; sentence bargain.[4]
The concept of plea bargaining may not be statutorily recognised by the Nigerian Criminal Justice System. As a matter of fact it is clearly prohibited by section 127 of the Criminal Code Act CAP. C 38 which makes the offence of compounding a felony punishable by 7 years imprisonment. A person may compound a crime by committing the offence of either agreeing not to prosecute a crime that one knows has been committed or agreeing to hamper the prosecution-also termed compounding a felony.[5] According to the learned authors,
If a prosecuting attorney should accept money from another to induce the officer to prevent the finding of an indictment against that person, this would be compounding a crime if the officer knew the other was guilty of offence, but would be bribery whether he had such knowledge or not,[6]
In the clear words of section 127 of the Criminal Code:
Any person who asks , receives ,or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person upon any agreement or understanding that he will compound or conceal a felony, or will abstain from, discontinue, or delay a prosecution for a felony, or will withhold any evidence thereof, is guilty of an offence.
If the felony is such that a person convicted of it is liable to be sentenced to death or imprisoment for life, the offender is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for seven years.
In other words, plea bargaining is a crime under the Nigerian Judicial System. But there is no equivalent provision under the Penal Code applicable in the Northern States of the Federation. Could this omission be interpreted to mean that plea bargaining is not known to this law?
But while this may be the position ex facie and the public frowns at its use, plea bargaining has surreptitiouly found its way into the same Criminal Code by the provision of Section 128. Section 128 provides that:
Any person who, having brought ,or under pretence of bringing an action against another person upon a penal Act, law or statute in order to obtain from him a penalty for an offence committedor alleged to have been committed by him, compounds the action without the order or consent of the court in which the action is brought or is to be brought, is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable to imprisonment for one year.[7]
Implicit in the above provision is the fact that plea bargaining is not only allowed but condoned. The only requirement for its validity is the order or consent of the court before which the action is brought or is to be brought.
It is arguable therefore, that the law maker might have appreciated or even anticipated the potential benefit of this process as a tool to facilitate trials, and therefore provided the necessary caveat.
It is equally arguable that the lawmaker has been precient in inserting this provision because it foresaw the frustrations currently being experienced by the law enforcers. For what other reason would this provision have found its way into the statute book?
The Customs and Excise Management Act,[8] section 186 0f the Act provideds as follows:
The Board may-
- without prejudice to the provisions of section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (which relates to the power of the Attorney General of the Federation to institute, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings relating against any person in any court of law ) and subject to such directions, whether general or special, as may be given by the Attorney General of the Federation, stay or compound any proceedings for an offence or for the condemnation of anything forfeited under the customs and excise law; or
- without prejudice to the generality of section 5 of this Act and subject to such directions whether general or special,as may be given by the Minister, restore anything forfeited or seized under the customs and excise Law.
Section 14 (2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment etc.) Act 2004 provides that as follows:
Subject to the provision of Section 174 of the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria 1999( which relates to the power of the Attorney General of the Federation to institute , continue , take-over or discontinue criminal proceedings against any person in any court of law). The Commission may compound any offence punishable under this Act by accepting such sums of money as it thinks fit, exceeding the maximum amount to which that person would have been liable if he had been convicted of that offence.
From the contradictory positions of the above laws on the offence of compounding a felony, the legislature is doing nothing short of blowing hot and cold; approbating and reprobating. While section 14 of the NDLEA Act condemnes plea bargaining in all its ramifications, the Custom and Excise Management Act practically advocates it’s use. The same also applies to the EFCC Act.
Also worhty of note is the power of the Attorney General of the Federation under the 1999 Constituition[9]. section 174 (c)which provides that the Attorney- General of the Federation shall have power to discontinue at any stage before final judgement is delivered any such criminal proceeding instituted or undertaken by him or any other authority or person. These powers may be exercised by him in person or through officers of his department. He is also to have regard to public interest and justice in so doing.
There is little doubt that these are very wide powers indeed. The basis for determining what is in the public interest and the interest of justice is not spelt out. It is subjective since there are no designated criteria for it. The Attorney-General could therefore engage in plea bargaining by other means if he so wishes and would be quite within the law. It could therefore be said with some degree of authority, that plea bargaining has always been part of our law. It was just hibernating..
4. The EFCC: Duties, Powers and Responsibilities
The Economic and Financial Crimes Act was enacted in 2004 as part of a national reform programme to address corruption, advance fee fraud and money laundering among others in response to pressure from the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (EATF), which named Nigeria as one of 23 non-cooperative countries in the International Community’s effort to fight money laundering.[10] According to the Act, the Commission shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and common seal. It may sue and be sued in its corporate name and may, for the purposes of its functions, acquire, hold or dispose of property movable or immovable. The Commission is designated Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Nigeria, which is charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes in Nigeria.[11] As the Nigerian arm of the FIU, it is vested with the responsibility of collecting Suspicious Transactions Report (STR) from financial[12] and designated non-financial[13] institutions, analyzing and disseminating them to all relevant government agencies and other FIUs all over the world.[14] The Commission is vested with powers to deal with a wide varieties of offences referred to as “economic and financial crimes”. The powers are listed in sections 6 and 7 of the Act.
For the first time therefore, in the history of the administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria, the power for the prosecution of the multifaceted economic and financial crimes are now vested in the EFCC established pursuant to the EFCC Act. It has been stated before that the bane of Nigeria does not stem from the lack of laws but with enforcement. And so on April 5, 2005, the EFCC charged the former Inspector General of Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun with 149 count charges of money laundering, official corruption and failure to fill assets declaration forms. On May 23, 2005 a N5.7 billion, new charges were also preferred against the said former Inspector General of Police. The new charges which bordered on gratification numbered 92 counts. He was alleged to have collected gratification running into several billions of naira on various police contracts he awarded while in office. The former police boss was also alleged to have received gratification of more than N2 billion as reward from banks where he retained deposit of police affairs account and police co-operative account. He was also alleged to have converted police co-operative fund and other votes released for welfare of the rank and file for his personal use.[15]
Pressure was mounted on the EFCC for an out of court settlement that would see the former Inspector General of Police forfeit assets so as to get a reprieve. Said an official of the EFCC:
You know, if an accused person pleads guilty to the charge against him without taking the prosecution through the rigour of trial, what happens is that such a person is sentenced to a minimal jail term. It is the practice all over the world. It is an international practice. If he is willing to surrender all his ill-gotten wealth and assets already traced to him, if he is willing to serve a minimal term, then there will be a deal.[16]
Based on this “DEAL”, the former Inspector General of Police was arraigned before a Federal High Court in Abuja in April, 2005 for multiple allegations of stealing, between January 2000 and February 2003, monies belonging to the Nigeria Police Force totalling N12,861,570,098. He was subsequently tried and jailed for six months, a minimal punitive jail term.
Under normal circumstances, these horrendous offences would have attracted a minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment under the Criminal Code Act.[17] This is arguably how the judicial tool of the plea bargaining surreptitiously started its journey into the national consciousness, a concept hitherto unknown under the statute, at least officially.
This paper examines the legality of the concept of plea bargaining, its merits and demerits and its future prospect as a judicial tool for courts and prison decongestion.
5. Concept
Plea bargaining as a legal concept of arranging a more lenient treatment by the court in exchange for the accused admitting to the crime or turning state’s evidence is the process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offence or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge. Plea bargaining in the Federal Courts in the United States of America is governed by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 11 (e). The negotiation is between the defence attorney in a criminal action and the prosecutor for a reduced charge in exchange for a plea of guilty. An important aspect of plea bargaining is that it gives a defendant a lighter penalty than he would otherwise have received if found guilty after a plenary trial. The defendant trades his right to a trial; pleads guilty to charges rather than risk serving a long sentence after a plenary trial if convicted.
While Plea Bargaining Procedure might be a novel concept to the Nigerian Criminal Justice System, it is very popular especially in the United States of America where prosecutors shop around for plea bargaining as salesmen shop around for clients.
According to Dirk Olin;
The plea bargain was a prosecutorial tool used only episodically before the 19th century. “In America,” Fisher says, “it can be traced almost to the very emergency of public prosecution. Although not exclusive to the U.S., it developed earlier and More broadly here than most places”. “But because judges, not prosecutors controlled most sentencing, plea bargain was limited to those rare cases in which prosecutors could unilaterally dictate a defendant’s sentence. Not until the crush of civil litigation brought on by explosion of personal injury cases in the industrial era did judges begin to appreciate the workload relief plea bargaining promised.[18]
It is therefore an important and necessary component of the American system of justice.
A variant of plea bargain called “charge bargain” occurs when the prosecutor allows a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge or to only some of the charges that have been filed against him while a “sentence bargain” occurs when a defendant is told in advance what his sentence will be if he pleads guilty. In the United States of America, England, Wales and Australia, it is allowed only to the extent that the prosecutors and the accused can agree that the accused will plead guilty to some charges and the prosecutor will drop the remainder.
While both the prosecutor and the defendant can bargain on the charges, they definitely do not have the power to decide what the appropriate penalty would be. A defendant cannot bargain on the issue of penalty which is determined solely by the judge; but the prosecutor can recommend sentence over which the judge also has the absolute discretion. The judge however, must accept the result of the plea bargain before accepting the plea.[19]
When a defendant pleads guilty to a charge, the implication is that he waives three fundamental constitutions rights, i.e. the right to fair trial[20], the right to confront and cross- examine his accusers,[21] the right to be free from self incrimination including exculpatory or impeachment evidence that tends to establish the factual innocence of the accused.[22]
The rule that an individual shall not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without notice and opportunity to defend himself predates our written constitution and is so fundamental that the records of court must disclose that the accused person voluntarily and knowingly pleaded to the charges.[23]
Therefore, the validity of plea bargaining depends on three basic conditions
- Knowing waiver of rights
- Voluntary waiver of rights
- A factual basis to support the charges to which the defendant pleads guilty.
A guilty plea must therefore be an informed choice entered voluntarily into by the accused. Due process of law also prohibits all governments from arbitrarily or unfairly depriving individual of their basic constitutional rights to life,[24] liberty[25] and property.[26]
A judge reserves the right to reject a plea bargain, if not satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into. Courts on the other hand usually take proofs to ensure that the above conditions are satisfied before accepting the recommendations of the prosecution.
Another variant of a plea bargaining may involve a situation where an attorney may advise his client to agree to testify against a co-defendant or to provide evidence that incriminates a co-defendant. Under this arrangement, the prosecutor may agree either to dismiss or reduce the charges against a defendant if he agrees to testify against his co-defendant as a prosecution witness.[27]
6. Demerit
Plea Bargaining has been dubbed bribery. That not only is it champertous in nature but a clear violation of the provisions of Criminal Code. Anyone in breach of the above provisions of the law is guilty of compounding a felony and the penalty for compounding a felony is seven years and three years imprisonment respectively.
Bola Ajibola[28] warned that the judicial tool called “plea bargaining” being used by the EFCC to secure conviction of corrupt public officers amounted to corruption. He advised that convicted corrupt politicians no matter how highly placed, should serve their prison terms. He warned that it would be counter-productive in the fight against corruption as it would encourage other people to steal public money or that the idea be discarded. Said he:
If you have stolen, let it be taken by due process, in accordance with the rule of law. Let those who are found guilty serve their terms; what is the essence of someone arrested, tried, convicted, sentenced and at the end of it you release him on plea bargain?[29]
Funsho Adaramola[30] also condemned the EFCC for:
entertaining the controversial plea bbargaining which saw prominent people in society negotiating their criminal acts with payment of money after prima facie case has been established against them.
Another eminent Nigerian[31] dubbed it “the institutionalization of corruption.”[32] He argued that plea bargaining should actually be thrown into the waste bin, saying that whosoever runs foul of the law should be punished adequately for his offences, since the practice is not known to our law. That it is cheating on society if public officers who wrought untold hardship on the public is allowed to pay their own ransom and let off the hook.[33]
7. The Need for Plea Bargaining.
Bleak as the above scenario may present and given the limitless capacity of the average Nigerian to thwart the best intentions of the law, this paper will nevertheless present the positive and beneficial side of plea bargaining.
The 1999 Constitution provides that “Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save”[34] in the circumstances enumerated thereunder. It also provides that “Any person who is arrested or detained in accordance with subsection (1) (c) of this section shall be brought before court of law within a reasonable time.[35]
The above provisions captures the essence of accused persons’ right. But these provisions are honoured more in the breach that the observance. The plight of accused persons in Nigeria has been vividly captured in the report of the Civil Liberties Organisation[36] on prison conjestion and the spate of indefinite detention before trial in Nigeria:
Prison Congestion:
It reads:
Behind the wall of virtually every prison in Nigeria is a slum where men and women too, literally live on top of each other. The housing conditions consistently reveal themselves, from prison to prison visited, to be wretched and deplorable. Overcrowded and almost devoid of sleeping and sanitary facilities each prison is a human cage stripped of all pretence to providing adequate conditions of even the most modest level of humane living. Each has been reduced to its most basic functions, manifested in its crudest and foulest forms: the forced incarceration of men with the sole purpose of isolating them from their fellow men and breaking their spirit. Given such a generally high degree of congestion, it is only natural that the existing facilities already obsolete by the passing of the decades, are terribly over-stretched. In many prisons, they have totally broken down. The consequent profound degradation of human life in the prisons cannot be gleaned even from the most accurate figures where cells hold as many as twice or even thrice their capacity, it would be strange indeed if their inmates did not undergo what amounts to a breaking of the body and soul. Nigeria unable to curb or eliminate the social pressures which encourage crime has resorted to practicing a very crude and brutal penal philosophy as a way out. The end result is congestion which is a direct cause of the violation of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
In Nigeria, indefinite pre-trial detention is common place, even though the law provides that you cannot detain a person for a period longer than the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed for the offence.[37] In practice, there is no fixed time span within which the trial of a remand prisoner must be concluded so long as the duration in the light of all the circumstances of the case, including the interest of the remand prisoner is taken into account.
Prisoners on remand a.k.a. Awaiting Trials outnumber convicts because they stay longer in prisons and in most cases overstay the time they would have done if they had been convicted of the offence itself.
The unintended consequence of this state of affairs is the high mortality rate among the “awaiting trial” cases. The blame for this unhealthy situation lies with the inefficiency of the whole system, starting with the slow pace of police investigation, the slow-motion public prosecution, the bar and the bench. Prison congestion thus has dire consequences both for the rights and health of inmates as well as fall-out on society of boiled-up resentment. The wheels of criminal trial in Nigeria grind exceedingly slow. In his keynote address to the Abuja Prisons Reforms Seminar, the Minister for Internal Affairs encapsulated these issues in these words:
Government views the state of affairs with great concern having regard to the fact that miscarriage of justice does easily result by the time these remand prisoners are brought to trial. For example, a situation could prevail where a remand prisoner could stay for a period of one or two years awaiting trial, only to be acquitted at the end of the case or given sentence shorter that the remand period. Besides there is the fear of efflux ion of time and the associated fading of memory both of which affect the remand prisoner (sic) would in turn help solve all other problems associated with congestion. It would not be out of place … to examine the role of our courts of law and the police in the prospect of the remand prisoner and suggest appropriate measures to be taken to effect efficacy in the speedy dispensation of justice.[38]
Nigeria is a nation in need of reforms in many areas of her socio-political life and congestion in our prisons and courts are key areas that can benefit from reforms. It is a cliche to state that corruption breeds poverty in the country. It is an impediment to progress. It undermines the economy and threatens the very existence of the country. A country like Nigeria with so much endowment in terms of resources has no business with poverty. In the search for reform in the criminal justice scheme, plea bargaining should be seen as a handy judicial tool because:
i. It will help to significantly decongest our prisons, since our prosecution system is adversarial in nature, is time consuming and expensive.
ii. It is an alternative judicial tool to replace the frustrations that results from interminable prosecution time.
iii. It will save cost and scarce resources which would be better used to improve the welfare of the citizens.
iv. It will offer a lot of workload relief to judges.
8. Conclusion and Recommendations
Its all very well to advocate for the plenary trial of corruption cases because that is the ideal. Every criminal should pay the price for his crime. But experience has shown that white collar crimes are notoriously difficult and expensive to prosecute. Conviction at the end of full trial is not guaranteed never mind the prospect of appeals to higher courts which persons accused of white collar crimes with a lot of slush funds to throw around can very well afford. It is time consuming. It takes an average of ten years to conclude a case because the target persons who are usually the “big fish” in society are filthy rich and can afford to employ the vast resources at their disposal to engage the services of the best legal minds to thwart, stall , impede and frustrate the judicial system. It does seem as though there has not been much success achieved since the exit of Mallam Ribadu This a clear testimony to the dificulty associated with plenary trial under the system. This is in contrast to the situation in the United States of America where less than ten percent of criminal cases go to trial, because of the wide use of plea bargaining.
It is suggested therefore that in order not to lay ourselves open to accusation of human right violations stemming from the long incarceration periods of “awaiting trial” prisoners on remand, a case be made for the full integration of plea bargaining into our Criminal Justice System with a strong legal framework in place and sufficient safeguards in place to check abuse. That way, trials are abridged; the rights of remand prisoners to speedy trial implicit in plea bargaining are preserved. It is a short cut to a fair and speedy trial. It helps the prosecutors and the courts in the effective administration of justice. The constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is not compromised. It saves the accused the mental ordeal of a lengthy trial with no guarantee of acquittal at the end.
Plea Bargaining is not a perfect tool and like all devices put together by humans is prone to abuse but at least it will serve to satisfy the abstract notion of justice. In our circumstances, it is a child of expediency. Let’s cut and run and barring any abuse, there is hope that the intended objectives will be realized.
* LLM(London), Lecturer; Department of Public and Private Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus.e-mail-christineike2004@yahoo.com
[1] Nuhu Ribadu “Problems Associated with the Enforcement of Economic Crime” (Paper presented at the NBA 2004 Annual Conference, International Conference Centre, Abuja, Monday 23rd August, 2004).
[2] See Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2005.
[3] Sections 35; 98; 98A; 98B; 99; 101; 102; 103; 104; 105; .390 (5) (7); S. 404 (1) (2): 435, Criminal CodeAct, Cap C.38, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 hereinafter, Criminal Code. See also sections 14,15, 16, 17 Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, Cap M 18, LFN, 2004 as amended in sections 1-14, Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Repeal and Reenactment) Act, 2011. See also sections 1, 7, 10 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act,Cap.A6, LFN 2004, as amended in 2006.
[4] See, Black’s Law Dictionary,9th edn. (USA, Thomson Reuters Business, 2009.) p1260.
[5] Ibid, p. 325.
[6] Perkins, Rollin M.;and Ronald N. Boyce ,Criminal Law (3rd edn.) (1982) p.539.
[7] Emphasis supplied.
[8] Cap. C 45, LFN., 2004.
[9] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Cap.C23, LFN, 2004.
[10] N. Ribadu, above note1.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Section 46 of EFCC (Establishment) Act defines “Financial Institutions” to mean banks, body, association or group of persons, whether corporate or incorporate which carries on the business of investment and securities, a discount house, insurance institutions, debt factorization and conversion firms, bureau de change, finance companies, money brokerage firm whose principle business includes factoring, project, equipment leasing, debt administration, fund management, private ledger services, investment management, local purchase order financing, export finance, project consultancy, financial consultancy, pension funds management and such other businesses as the Central Bank or other appropriate regulatory authorities may from time to time designate.
[13] “Designated Non-financial institutions” means dealers in jewelry, cars and luxury goods, chartered accountants, audit firms, tax consultants, clearing and settlement companies, legal practitioners, hotels, casinos, supermarkets or such other businesses as the Federal Ministry of Commerce or appropriate authorities may from time to time designate (section 46 of Act).
[14] N. Ribadu, above note 1.
[15] See Lillian Okenwa: “EFCC Slams N5.7bn Fresh Charges on Balogun”. Thisday, Tuesday, May 24, 2005 Vol. II No. 3685 p.16.
[16] Sheriff Balogun; “Who Breached the Contract, Balogun or EFCC,” Thisday, Wednesday February 22, 2006. Vol. II No. 3959 p.19.
[17] Section 390 (5) (7), Criminal Code.
[18] Dirk Olin, “Plea Bargain”, The New York Times Magazine, September 29, 2002, p.40
[19] Kayode Oladele: “Plea Bargaining”, An Indispensable Tool in the Criminal Justice System. Vanguard, Friday August 17, 2007 p. 45. Mr. Kayode Oladele has had an extensive criminal law practice in the United States of America.
[20] See section 36 (1), 1999 Constitution.
[21] Section 36 (6) ibid.
[22] Section 36 (1), ibid. See also section 183 of the Evidence Act, No.18, 2011 which repealed section 176 Evidence Act, Cap E 14, LFN, 2004.
[23] Section 218, Criminal Procedure Act .
[24] Section31 (1) 1999 Constitution.
[25] Ibid, section 35(1).
[26] Ibid, section 43.
[27] For evidence of co-accused see, section 198 (1)Evidence Act No 18, 2011, which repealed section 178 (2) Evidence Act, Cap E 1, LFN, 2004.
[28] Bola Ajibola is a former Attorney General of the Federation of Nigeria; a former World Court Judge; a former Nigerian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom of Great Britain.
[29] Ise-Oluwa Ige, “EFCC disagrees with Bola Ajibola on Plea Bargain” Vanguard, August 9, 2007, Vol. 23 p.1
[30] Funsho Adaramola is a Professor of Law and one time Dean, Faculty of Law, Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria.
[31] Abdul Wahab Abdulah, “Plea Bargaining is a cheat on the people”. Vanguard, October 12, 2007, p. 37.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Section 35(1), 1999 Constitution.
[35] Section 35(4). ibid,
[36] The Civil Liberty Organisation is a non-governmental organization for the protection of human rights founded on October 15, 1987 with headquaters in Lagos, Nigeria.
[37] Section 35(1), 1999 Constitution.
[38] See Emmanuel Olowu: “Justice, Punishment and Training Correction of Offenders in Nigeria Prisons: Policy Options”. Commissioned Paper presented to the Prisons Reform Seminar, Abuja, (September, 1990) pp. 6-7, (unpublished).